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ABSTRACT 
In this investigation, the researcher indirectly examines the role of NCLB school choice by 
performing an in-depth investigation of the open enrollment program in a Minnesota school 
district while further couching the results in the major assumptions of NCLB school choice.  
Secondary data analysis was completed in order to test the following four interconnected 
tests of hypotheses:  1) Are students requesting successful schools more than unsuccessful 
schools?  2) Are students leaving less successful schools more than successful schools?  3) 
Are ethnic minorities requesting successful schools more than unsuccessful schools?  4) Are 
ethnic minorities transferring out of unsuccessful schools more than successful schools?  
Multiple regression was used to test 10 models per hypothesis (for a total of 40 models).  
Results from this analysis were mixed, but in most cases MCA test scores seemed to be a 
poor predictor of student requests and student transfers. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
And we owe the children of America a good education.  And today begins a new era, 
a new time in public education in our country.  As of this hour, America’s schools 
will be on a new path of reform, a new path of results.  Our schools will have higher 
expectations.  We believe every child can learn.  Our schools will have greater 
resources to help meet those goals.  Parents will have more information about the 
schools, and more say in how their children are educated.  From this day forward, all 
students will have a better chance to learn, to excel, and to live out their dreams 
(President George W. Bush, as cited in Office of the Press Secretary, 2002). 
 
Statement of the Problem 
President Bush’s enthusiasm and confidence about the benefits of No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) seem clear in his comments made during his speech at Hamilton High 
School in January of 2002.  This piece of legislation dubbed, “the cornerstone of my 
Administration” by the President himself, is intended to improve the state of elementary and 
secondary education in the U.S., while at the same time giving all students better educational 
opportunities so as to “leave no child behind” (U.S. Department of Education, 2002).   
Since January 8, 2002 when President Bush signed it into law (Yell & Drasgow, 
2005), NCLB has become one of the most widely talked about and debated educational 
policies of this century (Hess & Finn, 2004).  This complex piece of legislation consists of a 
wide range of strategies, requirements, and goals, all of which are intended to increase 
student achievement and improve overall educational practices.  The various elements of 
NCLB are organized into four basic pillars:  1) stronger accountability for results, 2) more 
freedom for states and communities, 3) proven educational methods, and 4) more choice for 
parents (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.b; U.S. Department of Education, 2002).  While 
there are an unlimited number of topics and concerns to confront when examining this 
policy, the current focus is on the fourth pillar suggesting more choices for parents.  This 
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pillar of NCLB aims to improve both the condition of the nation’s failing schools as well as 
the educational opportunities available to the students previously trapped within these 
schools.  These aims are based on two main assumptions of NCLB school choice:  1) school 
choice will lead to school improvement through mechanisms of competition and 2) school 
choice will allow students previously trapped within failing schools the opportunity to seek 
options outside their school of origin (U.S. Department of Education, 2002).    
Over the past several years, much debate has taken place regarding the effectiveness 
and necessity of various forms of school choice such as private school vouchers, open 
enrollment, and charter schools.  However, because of its relatively recent implementation, 
little research has focused on the effectiveness of public school choice required of “failing” 
Title I schools under NCLB.  Additionally, few investigations have considered the unique 
situation in which pre-existing forms of choice are already in operation.  Because this piece 
of the NCLB legislation aims to support the most disadvantaged students in the U.S. 
educational system, it is critical to consider such unique situations in order to determine if the 
provision can and/or should be amended to be effective in all school districts and for all 
eligible students.   
Therefore, this investigation examines the NCLB school choice provision in a 
Minnesota school district (Albertville School District will be used as a pseudonym in order to 
maintain confidentiality) that has historically offered comprehensive open enrollment options 
to its students (a pre-existing form of school choice).   More specifically, the researcher 
indirectly examines the role of NCLB school choice by performing an in-depth investigation 
of the open enrollment program in the Albertville School District while further couching the 
results in the major assumptions of NCLB school choice.  In this way, the following may be 
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considered:  Is open enrollment meeting the intended goals of NCLB school choice?  If open 
enrollment is effective in meeting these goals, one must consider the role of NCLB school 
choice in such a district, and ask if it is essential to spend extra resources in order to 
implement a provision that is already being met through other effective forms of choice.  On 
the other hand, if the major goals of NCLB school choice are not the reality with the open 
enrollment program, one must further consider if significantly different results could be 
expected from the addition of the NCLB school choice consequence. 
In order to study the overall role of NCLB, the following four hypotheses will be 
tested: 1) Are students requesting successful schools more than unsuccessful schools?  2)   
Are students leaving less successful schools more than successful schools?  3) Are ethnic 
minorities requesting successful schools more than unsuccessful schools?  4) Are ethnic 
minorities transferring out of unsuccessful schools more than successful schools?   
Review of Remaining Chapters 
 The following outlines the organizational structure of this report and will offer the 
reader a preface of the upcoming chapters: 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review   
This chapter provides the reader with the background and literature on school choice.  
Specifically, the researcher focuses on the NCLB school choice provision, the two main 
assumptions of NCLB school choice, how NCLB school choice is carried out in Minnesota, 
and finally a discussion on the pre-existing forms of choice available in Minnesota.   
Chapter Three:  Materials and Methods 
 Chapter three of this report describes in detail the methods used for this research 
study.  It involves describing the obtained data sets, the steps required for cleaning and 
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organizing the data sets for data analysis, and ends with a review of the research questions 
and models to be used for statistical analysis. 
Chapter Four:  Results 
 The results chapter of this report begins with brief descriptive statistics, followed by 
results organized around the four research hypotheses under investigation.  Each hypothesis 
section contains on overview of the question being asked along with the expected results.  
This is followed by a correlation matrix and results from the 10 different models used to test 
each hypothesis.   
Chapter Five:  Conclusion 
 The final chapter, chapter five, begins with a discussion of study limitations 
(specifically as it relates to the obtained data) and continues with conclusions organized 
around the four research hypothesis.  Conclusions are made for each hypothesis that tie the 
results of multiple regression back to both the research hypotheses and literature.  This is 
followed by final conclusions combining all tests and all results.  This chapter ends with 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
NCLB School Choice Provision 
In investigating NCLB’s role in Albertville, it is first critical to examine the school 
choice pillar itself, the steps involved with its implementation, and finally the intended goals 
of the provision.  Beginning with the school choice pillar, the NCLB Act requires that Title I1 
schools labeled “in need of improvement,” by not meeting adequate yearly progress (AYP) 
for two consecutive years, must offer public school choice to their students.  Therefore, 
parents get to choose, from a select list, which school they want their child to attend.  
Although all students enrolled in “failing” Title I schools are eligible for school choice, if 
funding is not able to support all interested students, priority must be given to the lowest 
achieving children from the lowest income families (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.a).         
Parent choice and availability becomes further complicated and restricted when 
factoring in the issue of funding.  The major area in need of funding when implementing this 
program is transportation services.  A district is required to pay up to 20% of their total Title 
I allocations for choice services (this also includes supplemental services such as tutoring), 
and at least 5% of that must be used to support transportation costs of transferring students.  
Once again, when that funding requirement is met, the district is no longer responsible for 
funding any other students wanting to take advantage of the school choice option (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2003).  
 The next major element to consider with the school choice initiative is parent 
notification.  School districts containing “failing” schools are responsible to first inform 
                                                 
1 Title I schools are those schools with high percentages of poor children.  There are programs/grants available 
to such schools to help ensure that all children meet challenging state academic standards (U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.c.)  
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parents that their student is eligible to transfer to another public school because their current 
school is not performing at an adequate level.  Second, school districts must provide parents 
with a list of possible transfer schools, along with the performance and quality of those 
schools.  The list of choice schools that can receive students is limited to:  1) schools that 
have met AYP and are not identified as “in need of improvement” and 2) schools that are 
within the same school district, which may include other public schools or charter schools 
located within district boundaries (exceptions may be made, and are encouraged, if there are 
no schools available to receive students within the same district).  If a parent chooses to send 
their student to another school, the receiving school is responsible for that child until they 
have completed the highest possible grade level.  However, the district only has to pay for the 
transportation costs if the student’s school of origin is still labeled “in need of improvement” 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2003). 
 Assumptions of NCLB School Choice 
School Choice and Competition 
 Now that an understanding of the school choice pillar of NCLB, has been established, 
it is next critical to examine two main assumptions or goals of this public school choice 
requirement.  The first of these assumptions is that school choice will “encourage” failing 
Title I schools to improve (U.S. Department of Education, 2002).  Various elements of 
school choice have been sited as possible explanations to and incentives for school 
improvement.  The NCLB Act itself claims that “failing” schools’ potential of losing students 
along with corresponding budget allotments would offer a strong incentive for schools to 
improve.  The Act further states the ultimate consequence of school closure would add 
increasing urgency for “failing” schools to make changes to increase their test scores and 
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overall success (U.S. Department of Education, 2002).  Others contend that by holding 
schools accountable for their performance through threats of enrollment decline and school 
closure, teachers and administrators of these substandard schools would be “forced” to “fix 
the problems” associated with their school (Costa, Elseginy, Lusco, & Pinney, 2003). 
The consequences of enrollment decline, budget cuts, and potential school closure 
often associated with the school choice initiative coincide directly with theories of 
competition and market system ideologies that have also been cited as major reasons for the 
support of public school choice.  Godwin & Kemerer (2002) offer a helpful analogy to 
explain the basic idea of competition and how it works within a market system: 
To see how competition works, take the example of cars.  During the 1950s and early 
1960s, almost all automobiles sold in the United States were produced by four 
automakers – General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors.  The average 
life of a car produced in this period was only about fifty thousand miles, and its 
reliability and gas mileage were low.  The American automakers engaged in price 
collusion, and they relied on government to protect them from foreign competition. 
When the government lowered its trade barriers, Volkswagen, Toyota, Datsun (now 
Nissan), and Mercedes invaded the U.S. market.  These cars had life spans of over a 
hundred thousand miles, were significantly more reliable then their American rivals, 
and had better gas mileage than comparable cars made in the United States.  Within a 
short time, enough consumers switched to foreign-built cars to force American 
automakers to improve the quality of their cars and to lower their prices.  American 
Motors was unable to meet the foreign competition and went out of business (pg. 19). 
 
Therefore, the fundamental argument being made by those supporting the idea of 
competition within education is that public schools essentially hold a monopoly over 
education similar to the car industry in the 50s and 60s.  Proponents of choice further assert 
that sufficient pressure is not being applied to encourage schools to perform at adequate and 
efficient levels (Chubb & Moe, 1991).  By allowing parents the option to choose which 
school they wish to enroll their child, schools will have to compete to attract students (e.g., 
by offering quality programs, special curriculum, or employing highly qualified teachers).  In 
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order to be successful in attracting students, schools will ultimately be forced to improve 
(Patchen, 2004; Godwin & Kemerer, 2002; Hess, 2002) and low-performing schools would 
be eliminated (Viteritti, 2003; Van Dunk & Dickman, 2003; Belfield, 2003).  In using this 
argument schools are seen as existing within a market system where mechanisms such as 
competition are viewed as a positive way to create change (Patchen, 2004).   
Various authors beginning with Friedman (1953) have built on such theories of 
competition and market models within education.  In arguing the effectiveness of school 
choice in bringing about school improvement, Friedman (1953) suggested that by changing 
the overall structure of the educational system from one of monopoly control to a competitive 
market system (through the choice option), successful schools, like other market 
organizations, will thrive and “failing” schools will be flushed out of the system.  More 
recently, Chubb and Moe (1990) recommended a system of competition in which students 
would be given “scholarships” to attend private schools in order to improve the educational 
system as well as increase opportunities for poor, at-risk students.  Caroline Hoxby (2001) 
offers an effective summary of the school choice and competition argument: 
Supporters of school choice believe that public school administrators and teachers 
would respond with equal vigor to the prospect of seeing their students and funding 
walk out the front door.  Their professional pride and livelihood in jeopardy, they 
would work harder, adopt more effective curricula, hire more talented staff, and turn 
the district office into more of a support center than a maker and enforcer of rules.  
They would be spurred to innovate in ways that improve student achievement and 
parental satisfaction.  Competition would be the proverbial rising tide that lifts all 
boats (pg. 70). 
 
In addition to theories and models concerning competition and school improvement, 
research, although often focused on other forms of school choice, has further supported the 
overall argument of school choice improving the state of public education.  For example, 
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Hoxby (1994) in operationally defining competition as the concentration of private schools 
near public schools, found public schools experiencing higher levels of competition 
performed better than those located in areas with little “private school competition.”  Hoxby 
(2001) furthermore found that districts with “maximum interdistrict choice,” had 
significantly higher test scores than those districts with little or no choice available.  More 
specifically, her findings show that, “8th grade reading scores of students in highly 
competitive areas are 3.8 national percentile points higher than those of students in areas with 
no competition; their 10th grade math scores are 3.1 national percentile points higher, and 
their 12th grade reading scores are 5.8 national percentile points higher” (p. 71).   
 While many sources report school choice and its components to be positively 
correlated to school improvement, discourse and research on the area is very inconclusive 
with much being reported to support the opposite.  Those opposing school choice believe it to 
be a direct attack on public education (Wood, 2004; Darling-Hammond, 2004; Witte, 2000) 
and the mechanisms of school competition to be ineffective in improving the state of 
“failing” schools (Meier & Wood, 2004).  For example, many opponents of choice believe it 
will remove the best students from the poorest schools along with the most “politically 
active” parents which will in turn reduce the pressure for substandard schools to improve 
(Godwin & Kemerer, 2002).  In this case, the results of a competitive market-based 
educational system would have a negative impact on those schools most in need of assistance 
and improvement.  In addition, many believe that for competition to be successful, 
consumers, in this instance, parents, must be well informed about their situation (the state of 
their child’s current “failing” school) as well as their various options and alternative 
“products” (the characteristics of possible transfer school options) (Godwin & Kemerer, 
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2002).  This argument is strengthened when paired with the various reports suggesting 
adequate information to be a piece of the school choice implementation process that is 
consistently found to be lacking (GAO, 2004; Brown, 2004; Van Dunk & Dickman, 2003).  
Still others believe the mandated process of labeling a school as failing and requiring those 
schools to transfer their students to other, more successful schools, creates a large 
disincentive for qualified teachers and staff to remain in those schools most in need (Darling-
Hammond, 2004).   
Similar to the pro-choice side of the debate, one can look to both theories of 
competition as well as previous research to find compelling information that strengthen the 
overall arguments and assumptions being made by school choice opponents.  In his book, 
Revolution at the Margins, Hess (2002) notes three key elements central to theories of 
competition that he shows to be lacking from NCLB’s school choice provision.  Without 
these elements, Hess (2002) believes any improvement mechanisms characteristic to 
competition become irrelevant and therefore ineffective in bringing about change for 
“failing” Title I schools.  
First, according to theories of competition, in order for competitive pressures to bring 
about desired change, the threat of such pressure must be felt by the producers involved 
(Hess, 2002).  In the case of school choice, if school personnel do not perceive any real threat 
from school choice, school improvement is not likely to be a direct result of the competition 
intended to be created through the school choice provision.  Competition then becomes 
irrelevant and furthermore ineffective in creating positive change for “failing” public schools.  
The question then becomes, is the threat of competition actually experienced by teachers and 
school personnel?   
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Again, while little research has focused on NCLB choice directly, research on other 
forms of school choice has found no direct relationship between competitive presence (e.g., 
nearby private schools) and competitive awareness and effects.  For example, in an initial 
look at survey data, Van Dunk and Dickman (2003) found that a majority of teachers 
surveyed reported both the awareness of competition as well as direct effects of competition.  
Specifically they found that three fourths of teachers indicated the staff in their school had 
discussed the potential impacts of competition (competition awareness) and two thirds of the 
teachers reported changes made to attract or retain students (direct competition effects).  
However, when further analysis was completed, no relationship was found between these 
variables and the presence of competition.  Therefore, teachers from schools with “existent” 
competition did not report significantly different answers than those teachers coming from 
zero competition schools (Van Dunk & Dickman, 2003).   
In addition to not feeling the threat of competition, others have found that many 
teachers do not believe the intervention, whether felt by teachers or not, will actually lead to 
school improvement.  For example, Sunderman, Kim and Orfield (2005) found that teachers 
generally disagreed that labeling schools as failing will lead to school improvement and 
further rejected the notion that school choice would improve schools (less than 7% of 
surveyed teachers agreed with these statements).   
A second element of competition that is essential for it to be effective is consumers 
must have adequate information about the market as well as viable products to choose from 
(Hess, 2002).  Again, considering this element within the school choice debate, parents must 
have knowledge regarding their student’s current failing school along with several options of 
other, higher-performing schools to send their student to in order for competition to have any 
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direct effects on school improvement.  Once again, much research has found capacity 
(number of transfer school options) and adequate information to be deficient within the 
NCLB school choice provision (GAO, 2002; Brown, 2004; Van Dunk & Dickman, 2003; 
Neild, 2005).  For example, a study completed in Buffalo found that “75% of parents 
questioned did not realize their child attended a school identified for improvement” (Brown, 
2004, pg. 31).   
The final element noted by Hess (2002) to be required under theories of competition, 
is that producers must have the tools to adequately and effectively compete within the market 
system otherwise competition becomes irrelevant and therefore ineffective in improving 
public education.  In the case of school choice, this means that “failing” Title I schools must 
have the funding and personnel required to respond to any pressures of competition that are 
thought to create positive change for public education.  This has been one of the major 
complaints surrounding NCLB school choice provision (Darling-Hammond, 2004).  As 
stated previously, one of the requirements under this sanction is that schools must use up to 
20% of their Title I funds to pay for choice services and a great deal of their time and energy 
establishing plans for new bus routes, improved programming, etc. (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2003).  With all of their tools being taken away by the provision itself, little will 
be left to respond to the sanction’s competitive pressures and requirements (Darling-
Hammond, 2004).     
School Choice and Equal Educational Opportunity 
 Creating equal educational opportunities for all students, specifically for those 
students from the lowest socioeconomic backgrounds and with the lowest academic 
achievement records is the second major goal of NCLB school choice (U.S. Department of 
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Education, 2002).  In general, the impetus behind this goal is that parents with more financial 
resources have always been able to exercise choice by moving to whatever neighborhood 
they wish (Green & Winters, 2006; Goodman & Moore, 2001) or by enrolling their student 
in a private school, while low-income students are typically given fewer choices due to 
restrictions they face with where they can afford to live and what tuitions they can afford to 
pay (Archbald, 2004; Costa, Elseginy, Lusco, & Pinney, 2003; Goodman & Moore, 2001).  
Proponents further argue that such expanded choice will result in increased academic 
achievement for those students previously trapped within inferior schools (Yell & Drasgow, 
2005; Sunderman, Kim, & Orfield, 2005; Finn & Hess, 2004).     
 Theories and models such as the liberation model (Archbald, 2004) and the 
opportunity model (Coons & Sugarman, as cited in Viteritti, 2003) outline ways in which 
increased choice would offer more options for low-income, low-performing students.  The 
liberation model outlined by Douglas Archbald (2004) for example, makes the claim that 
poor, lower-class students are more likely to remain trapped within inferior schools than their 
upper-class counterparts.  It further assumes that school choice would reduce this economic 
“segregation among children in public school by creating access for lower-income families to 
schools outside their neighborhoods” (p.284).   
 Research focusing on various choice programs has resulted in a great deal of 
literature used to support the assumption of increased academic achievement for choice 
users.  For example, Belfield (2003) described the results from 25 different investigations all 
of which showed increased test scores for students to be a result of school choice availability.  
Goodman & Moore (2001) also found that when low-income students are given the 
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opportunity to attend middle-class schools they do “significantly better” academically than 
those who are not given that option. 
 Again, due to the controversy surrounding the use of school choice, many disagree 
with the educational opportunity assumption.  Three main, interconnected arguments are 
consistently given as reason for this counter-position.  First, it is argued that choice is not 
effective because students do not have a sufficient number of quality choice options.  It has 
been shown that some districts, often times urban districts, contain several schools on the 
“needs improvement” list.  This results in large numbers of eligible student transfers with 
small numbers of school options to choose from.  Furthermore, a person could also consider 
small rural districts that perhaps only house one or two schools, again resulting in an 
inadequate number of options for students to choose from (Finn & Hess, 2004). 
 A second argument closely related, if not a direct result of the first, is that students are 
simply not transferring (Brownstein, 2003; Howell, 2006).  Albertville can be used as a 
perfect example of this.  While there where over 17,000 families eligible for choice under 
NCLB, only 22 families actually utilized this option (Student Placement Office, personal 
communication, January 13, 2005).  That is less than a one fourth percent transfer rate.  
Similar results have been reported from school districts across the nation (Brownstein, 2003; 
Howell, 2006; Sunderman, Kim, & Orfield, 2005).  Furthermore, while this provision targets 
low income, low achieving student populations, studies have shown these populations to be 
transferring at even lower rates compared to their higher income, higher achieving 
counterparts (Bulman, 2004; Weidner & Herrington, 2006). 
 A final argument against school choice creating educational opportunities and 
increased student achievement, is that even when students do transfer, which again is at 
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minimal rates under NCLB, few, if any, achievement gains can be demonstrated (Howell, 
Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002; Robelen, 2006; Viteritti, 2003). 
NCLB School Choice in Minnesota 
 While the public school choice requirement is clearly and explicitly outlined in the 
NCLB document, each state may differ on the specifics of school choice including, Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP) requirements, AYP assessment measures, school choice participation 
and school choice implementation.  In order to gather such logistical information for 
Minnesota, several phone conversations and interviews were carried out.  One interview was 
with the supervisor for the Consolidated Federal Program Policy Division at the Minnesota 
Department of Education.  A second interview was conducted with the NCLB Compliance 
Officer for the Albertville School District.  Finally, information on participation rates was 
gathered from the Student Placement Office.  This office is responsible for distributing 
NCLB school choice information to interested parents.   
 Before information is given regarding how school choice works in Minnesota, one 
must have a clear understanding as to why a school is required to offer choice in the first 
place.  This involves an explanation of the complicated term, “Adequate Yearly Progress.”  
Minnesota looks at four different areas when calculating AYP standards:  participation, 
proficiency, attendance for elementary and middle schools, and graduation for high schools.  
Ninety-five percent of the student population as well as 95 percent of the individual 
subgroups present within a school must be administered the state test (given a three week 
time frame) in order for a school to meet the participation requirement (Minnesota 
Department of Education, 2005b).   
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 Minnesota uses the Minnesota Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) as their 
assessment tool and requires a score of 1420 to meet the proficiency standard.  A student’s 
raw score is given an assignment of level 1 through level 5 which later generates a 
corresponding index point and determines final proficiency scores.  More specifically, level 
3, 4, or 5 assignments generate one full index point and indicates an above proficiency score; 
level 2 generates one half a point, indicating a score that meets proficiency; and a student 
scoring at level 1 generates no index points for their particular school, indicating a score 
below proficiency.  Following initial assignment of index points, an index rate is calculated 
by taking the cumulative index points for a school, divided by the total number of students 
taking the test in that school and multiplying by 100.  This index rate for each school is then 
compared to the state’s “index target” (a predetermined benchmark for all schools in the 
state).  If the school’s index rate lies below the state target, that school fails to meet 
proficiency requirements.  If they are at or above the state target, they officially meet the 
proficiency aspect of AYP.  To meet AYP for attendance, Minnesota schools must have a 
daily attendance rate of 90% and for graduation AYP they must have a graduation rate of 
80% (Minnesota Department of Education, 2005a, 2005b). 
 If a school does not make AYP according to the above standards, they fall into Stage 
0 depicted in Figure 1 below and further consequences are determined using the following 
sequence of stages (again, a visual depiction of these stages can be seen in Figure 1 below): 
Stage 1.1.  A school has missed AYP for two consecutive years and is in the first 
stage of consequences in which a school must offer school choice to its students. 
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Stage 2.1.  A school has missed AYP for the third straight year and must offer 
supplemental services to its students (supplemental services include tutoring or after 
school programs). 
Stage 3.1.  A school has missed AYP for four consecutive years and is considered to 
be in the corrective action stage.  These corrective actions could involve extending 
the school day or school year, replacing school staff members, or appointing an 
outside expert to advise the school. 
Stage 4.1.  A school has missed AYP for five straight years and must submit a plan 
for restructuring.  This could involve plans to reopen the school as a charter school, 
replacing most of the schools staff, or turning over the operation of the school to the 
state. 
Stage 5.1.  A school must carry out their restructuring plan outlined in Stage 4.1. 
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 Again, if a school misses AYP for two consecutive years, the school choice 
procedures begin.  The first step is formal or public identification of the school.  In 2005, 
formal identification was done in Minnesota on August 29 (NCLB Compliance Officer, 
Makes AYP
Diagram described by Supervisor for the Consolidated Federal Program Policy Division (personal 
communication, October 14, 2005). 
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Figure 1.  Stages of AYP. 
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personal communication, December 2, 2005).  Following formal identification, parent 
notification letters are to be released.  This is supposed to take place before the start of the 
school year and is the responsibility of the district.  The NCLB Compliance Officer (personal 
communication, December 2, 2005) offered helpful insight as to what is involved with this 
process: 
Well, our office is responsible for preparing and mailing parent notification letters at 
the beginning of the school year.  So we mail them to all eligible families and do 
everything that is needed to set that up in terms of determining which schools and 
which families, and making sure our data is accurate and so forth.  We also help the 
Student Placement Office determine which schools they should make available for 
parents.  I don’t know if we went into this a little bit before hand, but the process in 
Albertville is that parents who want to take advantage of this choice are encouraged 
to contact our Student Placement Office, rather than us giving all the information in 
the letters to them because there is so much that goes into a choice such as this.  So 
the Student Placement Office is prepared to give them all the information about 
certain schools that they are looking at.   
 
The Compliance Officer (personal communication, December 2, 2005) also explained 
how the process of getting out parent notification letters in a timely manner is not always 
possible with the way the system is set up: 
We try to send those letters out, we are suppose to have them out by the first of the 
school year, but at least for Minnesota that is a little bit difficult because we get our 
final AYP data generally about the week before we start school here in Albertville.  
So it is hard to turn that around.  And we do have preliminary data before hand, but 
we do not want to prepare mailings that cost thousands of dollars on preliminary data.  
So we try to do it as quickly as we can, but it generally goes out some time in 
September, later September.  We hope to give parents the option to transfer their 
child, when their child is not too far into the school year. 
 
 Another important step with the school choice provision in Minnesota is the 
verification process used to make sure the schools and/or districts are indeed following 
through with the proper steps.  In Minnesota, 30 thousand dollar grants are given to those 
schools identified as “in need of improvement” but before that money is disseminated, 
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schools must provide the state with a copy of the letter that has been mailed to the parents 
explaining the reason, purpose, and options involved with school choice (Supervisor for 
Consolidated Federal Program Policy Division, personal communication, October 14, 2005).   
 No Child Left Behind school choice participation rates are quite minimal for the 
Albertville School District.  According to the Student Placement Office (personal 
communication, January 13, 2005), there were 17,586 students eligible for NCLB school 
choice in the 2005-2006 school year.  There were a total of 91 families who inquired about 
the choice option and only 22 that ultimately requested transfers under the NCLB school 
choice option.   
Pre-existing Choice Options in Minnesota 
Minnesota has historically offered comprehensive school choice options to its 
enrolled students.  The Minnesota Department of Education’s website (Minnesota 
Department of Education, n.d.b) describes six main choice options available to students 
throughout the state and specifically within the Albertville Public School District:  1) 
nonpublic schools, 2) charter schools, 3) alternative education programs, 4) online learning, 
5) open enrollment, and 6) the Choice is Yours program.  The focus here will be on Open 
enrollment and The Choice Is Yours program, as they both have high participation rates and 
are most in line with NCLB school choice. 
Open Enrollment 
Open enrollment gives families the option to have their student(s) attend a school 
outside of the school district in which they live.  Families must apply to the district of choice 
by January 15 in order to have the best chance of being admitted in the following fall.  In the 
open enrollment program, families usually provide their own transportation, but there are 
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district funds available for those families at or below poverty level.  In the 2005-2006 school 
year more than 30,000 families across the state of Minnesota took advantage of open 
enrollment options (Minnesota Department of Education, n.d.a).   
The Choice is Yours Program 
The second major choice option used by many in Minnesota, and specifically within 
Albertville is the Choice Is Yours (CIY) program.  CIY is a program reserved specifically for 
Albertville families who qualify for free and reduced lunch.  Again applications are due by 
January 15 in order to increase the likelihood of getting ones first choice in a non-resident 
district school (although CIY families receive priority placement at schools they request).  
For the purpose of this choice program, the city of Albertville is divided into two main 
sections:  North and South Albertville.  Depending on the geographical area a family resides 
in they are given a list of suburban districts and schools in which they could chose to send 
their child.  Also, a little different from general open enrollment, the state of Minnesota 
provides money for transportation to suburban schools and the Albertville School District 
provides the transportation to other Albertville schools of choice (Minnesota Department of 
Education, n.d.c).  This program began in the 2001-02 school year and the number of 
participating students has risen each year.  According to the evaluation report prepared by 
ASPEN Associates (2006), “total enrollments in suburban choice schools has increased each 
year from 472 students in year one, to 720 students in year two (53% increase), 1,030 
students in year three (43% increase), and 1,435 in year four (39% increase)” (pg. 7).  
Summary 
 The No Child Left Behind Act was implemented in order to both improve elementary 
and secondary education as well as to offer students a way out of inferior schools (U.S. 
22 
Department of Education, 2002).  These goals are based on two main assumptions of school 
choice:  1) competition between schools (brought about by school choice) will lead to school 
improvement and 2) school choice will offer students previously trapped within inferior 
schools the opportunity for a better education in a school outside of their neighborhood (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2002). 
 A unique situation not taken into consideration by the Act are school districts already 
operating under extensive school choice programs.  Considering the number of students who 
take advantage of open enrollment and the CIY Program in Minnesota compared to the 
minimal numbers participating in NCLB school choice one must question, “Is NCLB school 
choice effective and/or necessary in addressing school improvement and creating equal 
educational opportunities for all disadvantaged student populations and for all district types?”  
Again, by performing an in-depth investigation into the open enrollment and Choice is Yours 
programs and couching the results in the assumptions of NCLB school choice, the following 
will be determined:  Are pre-existing forms of choice meeting the requirements and goals of 
NCLB school choice?  If yes, should changes to the AYP consequences be considered for 
districts with pre-existing choice options?  If no, can one assume NCLB would offer 
significantly different results?  As succinctly stated by Finn and Hess (2004): 
Will a school turn itself inside out because it is losing two dozen kids to intradistrict 
choice…Moreover, many troubled schools are located in communities that have long 
offered such education options as magnet schools, open enrollment, interdistrict 
choice and charter schools…If that competition has failed to trigger a dynamic 
response from traditional public schools, one must ask why NCLB’s addition of two 
more choice programs will dramatically alter the picture (p. 45-46). 
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CHAPTER 3:  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Population 
The Albertville public school district was chosen as the population from which to 
study based on two main criteria.  1) The Albertville school district has relatively high 
percentages of students eligible for free and reduced lunch (FRL) as well as a high 
percentage of minority students in relation to the rest of the state’s school districts.  2) The 
Albertville school district has a high number of Title I schools identified for improvement 
compared to other districts within the state.  In this way, Albertville and its surrounding 
districts will be representative of the type of population which the NCLB school choice 
provision hopes to target. 
Open Enrollment Database 
Original Data Files 
Previously collected data on all students participating in the open enrollment and the 
CIY program in Albertville for the 2003-2004 through 2005-2006 school years was obtained 
and used for data analysis.  This data was obtained from the Accounting Office for the 
Albertville Public School District in Minnesota.  The original data was collected using the 
Open enrollment Form (see Appendix A) that parents fill out for each student transferring to 
another school district.  The information from this form is entered into an ACCESS database 
by staff at the Student Accounting Office.     
Two files were requested and obtained from the Albertville Public School District.  
One of the files contains student records of open enrollment/CIY moves out of Albertville 
(referred to as OE.Out for the remainder of the report) and one contains student records of 
open enrollment/CIY moves into Albertville (referred to as OE.In for the remainder of the 
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report).  The two files varied slightly.  The original OE.Out file encompasses the years from 
2003-2004 through 2005-2006, and contains a total of 6336 student records.  The following 
is a list of variables contained in this file along with a description of each:   
1. app:  A unique application number used to identify students. 
2. stdnt last name:  A student’s last name.  This variable was removed from the data 
set used for final analysis since student names are not necessary.  This variable 
was also removed to address confidentiality issues. 
3. stdnt first name:  A student’s first name.  Similar to the student’s last name, this 
variable was removed from the data set used for final analysis due to its 
unimportance and issues related to confidentiality. 
4. stdnt #:  A unique student identifier used instead of student names to identify 
individual students within the data base.  In this way student confidentiality was 
preserved. 
5. eth:  A student’s ethnic number.  The Albertville School District breaks this 
variable down as follows: 
1 = American Indian 
2 = African American 
3 = Asian American 
4 = Hispanic American 
5 = White American 
6. M/F:  The sex of the student. 
7. zip:  The zip code of the district in which the student resides. 
8. dist #:  The requested district id. 
9. dist name:  The name of the requested district. 
10. school requested:  The school requested by the student. 
11. grd:  The grade of the student 
12. tran yr:  The year the student transferred using school choice options. 
13. previous school:  The name of the school the student chose to transfer out of. 
14.  code:  The previous school type.  The Albertville School District breaks this 
variable down as follows: 
  0 = unknown 
  1 = Albertville Public School 
  2 = Non-public school 
  3 = Charter School 
  4 = Home School 
  5 = Other Minnesota public school 
  6 = Another State 
  7 = Another Country 
 8 = IDDS/FAIR school (Inter-District Downtown School and Fine Arts 
Interdiciplinary Resource School) 
9 = None (the student is going into Kindergarten so they do not have a 
previous school). 
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15. tran rsn:  The transfer reason given by the student (See Appendix B for break 
down of this variable). 
16. app/dis:  The decision with regards to the transfer request – approved or 
disapproved. 
17. notes:  The only entry in this field of importance is if a comment indicates the 
application has been cancelled.  This would mean the student never actually used 
open enrollment/CIY. 
18. sp ed:  Indicates whether a student is a special education student. 
19. program:  The option program requested by the student.  The following describes 
the different types of programs offered in Albertville: 
OPN = Open enrollment 
IDT = Inter-District Transfer or Non-Resident Agreement 
CON = Continued Enrollment of 11th and 12th graders 
HSG = High School Graduation program 
20. start date:  The year the student began in the requested school and district. 
21. end date:  The year the student stopped enrollment in the requested school and 
district. 
 
The OE.In file encompasses the years from 1989-1990 through 2005-2006, and 
contains a total of 8913 student records.  Again, the following outlines the variables 
contained in the OE.In file (if a variable listed below is also listed in the OE.Out file, a 
description is not provided):   
1. app: 
2. stdnt last name: 
3. stdnt first name: 
4. stdnt #: 
5. DOB:  The student’s date of birth. 
6. eth: 
7. M/F: 
8. parent last name:  The parent’s last name.  Similar to the student’s name, this 
variable is not included in the final data set used for this investigation.   
9. parent first name:  The parent’s first name.  Similar to the student’s name, this 
variable is not included in the final data set used for this investigation.   
10. house #: 
11. street name: 
12. city: 
13. zip: 
*Variables 10, 11, 12, and 13 provide the student’s address.  These variables were not 
included in the final data file. 
14. res #:  The id number for the student’s district of residence (previous district). 
15. res dist name:  The name of the student’s district of residence (previous district). 
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16. school requested: The school requested by the student (requested schools will 
always be an Albertville Public School in this file). 
17. grd:   
18. tran yr:   
19. eve phone:  This variable is not necessary for the purpose of this study and 
therefore was not included in the final data file. 
20. day phone:  This variable is not necessary for the purpose of this study and 
therefore was not included in the final data file. 
21. program: 
22. tran rsn: 
23. app/dis: 
24. notes: 
25. sp ed: 
26. start date: 
27. end date: 
 
It should be noted that the OE.In file only includes the previous district and never 
provides the previous school.  This will be of importance when considering the type of 
analysis utilized for this project. 
Data Files to be Constructed 
 The datasets provided to the researcher contain student level records, however, for the 
purpose of this study, the data needed to be aggregated at the school level.  Specifically, two 
main data files were necessary:  1) a file containing both transfers into and out of Albertville; 
aggregated by requested school.  This file ultimately provided requested school 
demographics along with the number and percentage of requests received by a school.  2) A 
file containing only transfers out of Albertville; aggregated by a student’s previous school (as 
mentioned previously, the In.OE file never listed a previous school, so this file could not be 
included for this analysis).  For this second data file, only previous Albertville schools were 
included, therefore, it ultimately contained demographics on Albertville schools losing 
students to open enrollment/CIY along with the exact number and percentage of students 
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lost.  In order for these two aggregated files to be created, the following data clean-up and 
organizational steps were completed. 
Data Clean-up and Organization 
 Several steps were necessary in order to make the data ready for data analysis.  First, 
both files were sorted and filtered according to the following criteria:  1) only the 0304, 0405, 
and 0506 school years were included.  This was only a factor with the OE.In file.  2)  Only 
student records describing open enrollment moves were included.  Therefore, records must 
have contained “OPN” for the program variable.  3) Only student records NOT containing 
“cancel” under the notes variable were included.  All cancelled requests were therefore 
removed from the database.  4) Finally, if a record indicated “DIS” for the app/dis variable, 
they were also removed from the final data set.  These initial sorts resulted in the OE.In file 
to be reduced from 8913 records to 2886 and the OE.Out file from 6336 to 4397.   
Once the datasets contained only records of interest for this investigation, the second step 
involved in data clean-up was matching entered previous and requested districts and schools 
with official Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) school and district names.  School 
and district ids (also downloaded from the MDE website) were further added to the database.  
These steps were critical in order to complete file merging which will be outlined in 
subsequent steps. 
 The two datasets (OE.In and OE.Out) were treated a little differently for the step of 
matching official MDE names and ids to the schools provided in the Open enrollment 
database.  For the OE.In file, since no previous schools were ever given only requested 
schools needed to be matched with official MDE names and ids.  One hundred percent 
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matching was not obtained for this file.  Specifically, two schools accounting for three 
student records could not be matched with an official MDE school and district name and id. 
 For the OE.Out file, a few more steps were necessary.  First, the requested schools 
needed to be matched.  Once again, 100 percent matching was not obtained.  A total of 26 
student records could not be matched on their requested school name.  Second, the previous 
schools needed to be matched.  For this step, only Albertville schools were of interest so 
matching non-Albertville schools was not necessary (a total of 1690 student records had 
previous Albertville schools)2.  Not all previous schools could be matched in this step.  
Specifically, a total of 32 student records would later need to be removed due to the inability 
to match their previous Albertville School with an official MDE name and id.  The following 
outlines reasons for the lack in 100 percent match: 
 Recall, the OE.Out file listed previous schools along with a corresponding 
school/district code (actual district names were not given).   
1) An unidentified (unmatched) district and/or school could occur if it could not be 
found in any MDE district and/or school file list.   
2) An unidentified district and/or school could occur if the listed school exists in 
multiple districts and the school code provided is 5 (Minnesota public school – not an 
Albertville Public School).  In this instance, one could not be sure what school and 
district was actually requested. 
                                                 
2 While one would assume all previous schools in the transfers OUT of Albertville file would be Albertville 
schools, this was not always the case.  An explanation can be given in the following example:  Student A 
attends Johnson Middle School, a school in the Heartland School District.  Student A then moves into the 
Albertville School District, but wants to continue enrollment at Johnson Middle School.  This record would still 
be considered an Open Enrollment transfer OUT of Albertville even though the previous school was not an 
Albertville school.  
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 A final piece of database clean-up and organization was the addition of a building id.  
The construction of this id was necessary due to the fact that school ids were not unique (i.e., 
two different schools could have the same school id, but different district ids).  A unique 
identifier was critical for aggregating the data.  The building id was constructed by taking the 
school id multiplied by 1000 and then adding it to the district id.  This would result in a 
unique number that accounts for both the school and the district. 
Aggregating Data Files 
 Once the datasets were cleaned and organized they then needed to be converted from 
student level records to school level records.  This involved aggregating the files.  Again, two 
main files were created:  1) One containing both transfers into and out of Albertville, 
aggregated by the requested school and 2) one containing only transfers out of Albertville, 
and only previous Albertville schools, aggregated by previous school.  
Requested school aggregated file.  In order to aggregate by the requested school, it 
was first necessary to combine the OE.In file (containing 2883 student records) with the 
OE.Out file (containing 4371 student records).  This dataset containing 7254 student records 
was then opened in SPSS and aggregated by the requested building id.  The number of 
student requests was recorded for each school along with that number broken down by ethnic 
category.  In addition, another variable, request rate (number of students who requested that 
particular school divided by the schools PK-12 enrollment) was also included in the file.  
This aggregating resulted in the 7254 student level records to be combined into 274 school 
level records.   
Previous Albertville School Aggregated File.  In order to aggregate by the previous 
school, only the OE.Out file was considered and further, only previous Albertville schools 
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were included.  Again, the records were opened in SPSS and aggregated by the previous 
building id.  For this dataset, the count of transfers out of the school along with that count 
broken down by ethnic category was included as well as the transfer rate (number of students 
who transferred out of that particular school divided by the schools PK-12 enrollment).  This 
aggregating resulted in the 1658 student records to be combined into 96 school level records. 
Addition of Key Variables 
Four key variables needed to be added to the two main aggregated files:  PK-12 
enrollment, FRL enrollment (which was later converted to a percent and used as a measure of 
SES), minority enrollment (which again was later converted to a percent and used as a 
measure of diversity), and average MCA scores (averaged across grade and subject).  The 
first three variables were selected for merging as they can all be shown to be predicators of 
student achievement and/or school success3.  In addition, MCA scores were used since 
NCLB uses AYP to determine the quality of a school and MCA scores are what Minnesota 
uses as their assessment measure for proficiency standards.  Tables from the MDE website 
were downloaded which contained all Minnesota schools and all necessary demographics.  
These tables were downloaded by appropriate year:  one each for 0304, 0405, and 0506.   
After downloading all necessary tables, the first step in adding these variables was to 
calculate an average for each variable that would provide a single value for the three years 
worth of data.  Therefore, if a school was given three different values for enrollment; say 500 
in 0304, 600 in 0405 and 550 in 0506, that particular school would have an average 
enrollment of 550.  Furthermore, building ids once again needed to be constructed for these 
                                                 
3 The reasons for the difference in performance between school and/or student types are complex and far-
reaching and will not be discussed here.  However, it must be stressed that the researcher is not implying poor, 
minority schools to be of inherently lesser quality or poor, minority students to be of lower academic ability.   
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demographic tables, using the same technique as described previously.  This process was 
completed for all four variables.  Once schools had one single value for each of the four 
variables, the MDE tables were merged with the two aggregated open enrollment files.  Files 
were merged using the constructed building id as the matching variable.  This step therefore 
added requested (and previous Albertville) school demographics to each of the files.  
Final Datasets  
For clarity purposes, the following outlines the variables (along with their 
descriptions) of the two final datasets used for analysis: 
Requested School Aggregated File. 
1. Building:  Unique Building ID. 
2. RDistrict:  Requested District Name. 
3. DistID:  Requested District ID. 
4. RSchool:  Requested School Name. 
5. SchID:  Requested School ID. 
6. Requests:  Number of students who requested that particular school. 
7. Request Rate:  Number of students who requested that particular school divided by 
that school’s PK-12 enrollment. 
8. Ethnic0:  Number of students who requested that particular school with no given 
ethnic category. 
9. Ethnic1:  Number of American Indian students who requested that particular school. 
10. Ethnic2:  Number of African American students who requested that particular school. 
11. Ethnic3:  Number of Asian American students who requested that particular school. 
12. Ethnic4:  Number of Hispanic American students who requested that particular 
school. 
13. Ethnic5:  Number of White American students who requested that particular school. 
14. Ethnic Requests:  Total number of minority students requests (Ethnic1 + 2 + 3 + 4). 
15. Ethnic Request Rate:  Number of minority student requests divided by that school’s 
minority enrollment. 
16. Enrollment:  Average PK-12 enrollment for particular school. 
17. FRL:  Average FRL enrollment for particular school. 
18. FRL Percent:  Average FRL percent for particular school. 
19. Minority:  Average Minority enrollment for particular school. 
20. Minority Percent:  Average minority percent for particular school. 
21. MCA:  Average MCA score for particular school. 
 
Previous Albertville Aggregated File. 
1. Building:  Unique Building ID. 
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2. PDistrict:  Previous District Name. 
3. DistID:  Previous District ID. 
4. PSchool:  Previous School Name. 
5. SchID:  Previous School ID. 
6. Transfers:  Number of students who transferred out of that particular school. 
7. Transfer Rate:  Number of students who transferred out of that particular school 
divided by that school’s PK-12 enrollment. 
8. Ethnic0:  Number of students who transferred out of that particular school with no 
given ethnic category. 
9. Ethnic1:  Number of American Indian students who transferred out of that particular 
school. 
10. Ethnic2:  Number of African American students who transferred out of that particular 
school. 
11. Ethnic3:  Number of Asian American students who transferred out of that particular 
school. 
12. Ethnic4:  Number of Hispanic American students who transferred out of that 
particular school. 
13. Ethnic5:  Number of White American students who transferred out of that particular 
school. 
14. Ethnic Transfers:  Total number of minority transfers (Ethnic1 + 2 + 3 + 4). 
15. Ethnic Transfer Rate:  Total number of minority transfers divided by that school’s 
minority enrollment. 
16. Enrollment:  Average PK-12 enrollment for particular school. 
17. FRL:  Average FRL enrollment for particular school. 
18. FRL Percent:  Average FRL percent for particular school. 
19. Minority:  Average minority enrollment for particular school. 
20. Minority Percent:  Average minority percent for particular school. 
21. MCA:  Average MCA score for particular school. 
 
Operational Definitions 
School Success 
A very critical part of this report is defining what will later be referred to as 
successful and unsuccessful schools.  NCLB will again be used as the place from which to 
couch this discussion.  NCLB school choice is available to students whose school has failed 
to meet adequate yearly progress (AYP) for two consecutive years.  AYP is based on four 
main criteria:  participation rates (the percentage of students who take the state-wide exam), 
proficiency rates (test scores), graduation rates, and attendance rates. If a school misses the 
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mark on any one of these criteria, they will not meet AYP standards for that year.  Therefore, 
according to NCLB, a successful school is one that scores high in all of the AYP areas, while 
an unsuccessful school is one that misses the mark in one or more of the areas, resulting in a 
failure to meet the AYP standards (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.a).   
 Considering how NCLB uses the AYP criteria to define the success level of a school, 
it would make most sense to assume actual participation, proficiency, graduation, and 
attendance rates to define successful and unsuccessful schools in this investigation.  
However, most of this data was not available to the researcher.  Specifically, only data 
capturing the proficiency aspect of AYP was obtained.  Because of this, the following 
variables were considered in place of participating, graduation, and attendance:  enrollment 
(size of a school), FRL percent of a school, and minority percent of a school.  Further detail 
and justification of these variables follows: 
Enrollment. This variable describes school population in terms of the number of PK-
12 students enrolled.  Previous research has been inconsistent when determining the impacts 
of school size on academic achievement, with some reporting positive relationships between 
school size and academic achievement, some reporting negative relationships, and some 
finding no relationship at all (Borland & Howsen, 2003; Gardner, Ritblatt, & Beatty, 2000).  
However, a study by Gardner, Ritblatt, and Beatty (2000) found smaller schools to have 
lower dropout rates and less absenteeism than larger schools.  Dropout rates and absenteeism 
align closely with two of the facets of AYP:  graduation and attendance.  Because of this, this 
study will assume large schools to be less successful than smaller schools.  
For the Requested School Aggregated File, enrollment size ranged from the smallest 
school with a three-year average enrollment of 14 to the largest school obtaining a three-year 
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average of 3307.33.  For the Previous Albertville Aggregated File, the range was quite a bit 
smaller going from 16.67 for the smallest school to 1881.67 for the largest. 
FRL percent. This variable gives the percentage of students in a school that are 
eligible for free and reduced lunch (FRL).  Again, looking at the literature, FRL percent is 
often used as a measure of socio economic status (SES), and more specifically, is used as a 
measure of poverty.  Furthermore, it is shown that children living in poverty, or those 
children receiving FRL, are often at risk of failing or dropping out of school (Taylor, 2005).  
For example, poor youths are more likely to attend low-quality, resource-poor schools 
(Eamon, as cited in Eamon, 2005).  Furthermore, children attending high poverty schools 
with high crime rates, small budgets, and few advanced course offerings often have lower 
achievement scores (Catsambis & Beveridge, as cited in Eamon, 2005; Secker, 2004; 
Gutman & Midgley, 2000).  Therefore, for the purpose of this research, schools with higher 
poverty levels, measured by higher FRL percents, are considered to be less successful 
schools.  Again, for the Requested School Aggregated file, this percentage ranges from zero 
to 98.45 percent and for the Previous Albertville Aggregated file, from 7.08 to 100 percent.   
Minority percent. This variable provides the researcher with the percentage of 
students in a school who are considered to be minority students.  Since minority status is so 
closely tied to a student’s poverty level, with minority students being disproportionately 
affected by poverty, students considered to be minority are again at a higher risk of school 
failure such as dropped courses, or not completing school (Taylor, 2005). Therefore, to be 
consistent with the literature, this study considers high minority schools to be less successful.  
For the Requested School Aggregated file, minority percent ranges from 1.34 to 100 percent 
and for the Previous Albertville Aggregated file, it ranges from 5.78 to 99.57 percent. 
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MCA score. This variable indicates the average MCA score a school received and is 
used to capture the proficiency aspect of AYP.  This score is averaged across grade, content 
(math and reading) as well as across three years worth of data.  Operationally defining this 
variable is more straight forward with higher scores indicating a more successful school 
(again, a score of 1420 is needed to meet proficiency).  For the Requested School Aggregated 
file, MCA scores range from 743.9 to 1632.4 and for the Previous Albertville Aggregated 
file, scores range from 440.10 to 1465.15.    
Research Hypotheses 
In order to address the predominant research question, what is the role of NCLB in a 
district with pre-existing choice options, the following four hypotheses will be tested:    
Hypothesis #1. Are students requesting successful schools more than unsuccessful 
schools?  Assuming the intended consequences of NCLB to be true, specifically, assuming 
school choice leads to school improvement and better educational opportunities, one must 
further assume that when given the choice, students will request enrollment at successful 
schools over unsuccessful schools.  If this is not the case, if successful schools are not 
receiving more student requests than unsuccessful schools, this goal would not be met.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis in this situation would be that there is no difference in the 
number and rate of student requests, while the alternative would be that more successful 
schools are receiving more requests than those schools considered to be less successful. 
Hypothesis #2. Are students leaving less successful schools more than successful 
schools? Again, assuming the intended consequences of NCLB to be true, one must further 
assume that when given the option, students/families will choose to leave substandard 
schools in order to receive a “higher quality” education elsewhere.  Therefore, the null 
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hypothesis would be that schools lose students at equal rates, while the alternative would be 
that unsuccessful schools lose students to open enrollment options more than successful 
schools. 
Hypothesis #3.  Are ethnic minorities requesting successful schools more than 
unsuccessful schools?  Once again, if NCLB is correct in assuming school choice will offer 
student minorities the option of more quality educational choices, one must further claim that 
when given the option, minority students will choose successful schools to attend over 
unsuccessful schools.  If minorities are not choosing higher performing schools, this goal will 
not be met.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is minorities request successful schools equally as 
often as unsuccessful schools while the alternative is that minorities request attendance to 
successful schools more than to unsuccessful schools. 
Hypothesis #4.  Are ethnic minorities transferring out of unsuccessful schools more 
than successful schools?  Similar to Hypothesis #3, if NCLB is correct in assuming school 
choice will offer student minorities the option of more quality educational choices, one must 
further claim that when given the option, minority students will choose to leave their 
potentially unsuccessful school.  If minorities are not choosing to leave unsuccessful schools, 
this goal will not be met.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is minorities transfer from 
successful and unsuccessful schools at equal rates, while the alternative is these students 
transfer from unsuccessful schools more than from successful ones. 
Models Used in Multiple Regression 
To test these various hypotheses, multiple regression was completed (and 
supplemented with partial F-tests) using enrollment, FRL percent, minority percent, and 
MCA score as the predictor variables (IV) assumed to measure school success.  Transformed 
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request (or transfer) numbers, and transformed request (or transfer) rates were the dependent 
variables (DV) assumed for this analysis.  Transformations are used to correct skew and 
bring data closer to the normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  In this investigation 
the distributions of request and transfer numbers and rates were all highly skewed.  In the 
case of raw request and transfer numbers, both distributions were positively skewed 
(skewness = 3.372 for request and skewness = 1.501 for transfers).  In order to bring these 
distributions closer to normal, to reduce the amount of skew, the following log 
transformation was used: 
Transformed Request = Ln(requests) 
After transformations were completed for the raw request and transfer numbers 
skewness decreased to .282 for requests and .028 for transfers.  In addition, following 
transformations, for requests, the distribution of values ranged from .693 to 5.778.  Twenty-
five percent of the data points were less than or equal to 1.099 while 25 percent of the data 
points were greater than or equal to 3.597.  Similarly, for transfers, following 
transformations, the distribution of values ranged from .693 to 4.443 with 25 percent of the 
data falling at or below 1.609 and 25 percent of the data falling at or above 3.332 (these same 
transformations were completed for minority request and transfer numbers, with similar 
results, however, specifics will not be discussed). 
 The distributions for request and transfer rates were again skewed with skewness 
equaling 1.973 for request rate and 1.397 for transfer rate.  Since these were distributions of 
proportions a different transformation was needed to be used which reduced the variability in 
the middle of the distributions.  Again, the following equation was used to transform all data 
points: 
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Transformed Rate = ArSin(SqrtRate) 
So, in this instance, the square root of every request (or transfer) rate was first 
calculated, then that was multiplied by the ArSin function.  For these two distributions, using 
the transformation again greatly reduced the skewness down to .816 for request rate and to 
.504 for transfer rate.  In addition, as a result of transformations, the distribution for request 
rate ranged from .0238 to .5994, with the 25th percentile equaling .0587 and the 75th 
percentile equaling .2648.  Similarly, for transfer rates, following transformations, the 
distribution of values ranged from .0417 to .4198 with 25 percent of the values being less 
than or equal to .1133 and 25 percent of the values being greater than or equal to .2437 
(again, these transformations were also completed for minority request and transfer rates, but 
further detail will not be given).  . 
Due to additional issues with collinearity among several of the predictor variables 
(which will be outlined in subsequent pages and depicted in correlation matrices), a total of 
10 models were required for each of the four hypotheses in order to determine the extent to 
which requests and transfers are a function of enrollment, FRL percent, minority percent, 
and/or MCA test scores.  The following outlines the ten models considered for each of the 
four research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis #1. 
 M1:  Ln(Requests) = f(enrollment) 
 M2:  Ln(Requests) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
 M3:  Ln(Requests) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
 M4:  Ln(Requests) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M5:  Ln(Requests) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA) 
M6:  Arsin(Sqrt Request Rate) = f(enrollment) 
M7:  Arsin(Sqrt Request Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
M8:  Arsin(Sqrt Request Rate) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
M9:  Arsin(Sqrt Request Rate) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M10:Arsin(Sqrt Request Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA)  
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Hypothesis #2. 
 M1:  Ln(Transfers) = f(enrollment) 
 M2:  Ln(Transfers) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
 M3:  Ln(Transfers) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
 M4:  Ln(Transfers) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M5:  Ln(Transfers) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA) 
M6:  Arsin(Sqrt Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment) 
M7:  Arsin(Sqrt Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
M8:  Arsin(Sqrt Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
M9:  Arsin(Sqrt Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M10:Arsin(Sqrt Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA)  
 
Hypothesis #3. 
 M1:  Ln(Minority Requests) = f(enrollment) 
 M2:  Ln(Minority Requests) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
 M3:  Ln(Minority Requests) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
 M4:  Ln(Minority Requests) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M5:  Ln(Minority Requests) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA) 
M6:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Req Rate) = f(enrollment) 
M7:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Req Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
M8:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Req Rate) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
M9:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Req Rate) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M10:Arsin(Sqrt Minority Req Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA)  
 
Hypothesis #4. 
 M1:  Ln(Minority Transfers) = f(enrollment) 
 M2:  Ln(Minority Transfers) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
 M3:  Ln(Minority Transfers) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
 M4:  Ln(Minority Transfers) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M5:  Ln(Minority Transfers) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA) 
M6:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment) 
M7:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%) 
M8:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, minority%) 
M9:  Arsin(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, MCA) 
M10:Arsin(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) = f(enrollment, FRL%, minority%, MCA)  
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CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS 
 Before looking at the results from multiple regression, simple descriptive statistics are 
depicted in the following table: 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Eight Dependant Variables 
 Sample Size Mean Value St. Deviation 
Requests 257 27.46 43.98 
Request Rate 257 .04 .06 
Transfers 88 17.28 18.37 
Transfer Rate 88 .04 .04 
Minority Requests 222 23.88 37.16 
Minority Request Rate 222 .09 .10 
Minority Transfers 82 14.41 15.45 
Minority Transfer Rate 82 .04 .03 
 
 There were 17 schools removed from the requested file before data analysis was 
completed (including descriptive statistics).  Specifically, 16 schools were removed because 
they did not have MCA scores and one school was removed because it had a request rate 
greater than one.  This occurred since the school had a greater number of requests than their 
total PK-12 enrollment.  Upon closer examination, this building was determined to be a 
special program with a very low enrollment.  In addition to the case just mentioned, for the 
minority request and minority request rates, 35 schools were removed.  These schools had no 
minority requests, so their data could not be used with the transformations and would have 
ultimately skewed results.  For the transfer file, similar deletions were necessary.  Seven 
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schools were removed due to lack of MCA score while six buildings had to be removed for 
the minority transfer and minority transfer rates because the buildings received no minority 
transfers. 
 It is next important to take note of the distribution of requests and transfers.  In this 
set of data, most requests cluster around one.  Specifically, 37.4 percent of the 272 schools 
only received between one and three requests (46 schools received one request, 28 schools 
received 2 requests, and 22 schools received 3 requests).  Because the size of a school could 
greatly skew the number of requests received, with larger schools likely receiving more 
requests, it is also important to look at the request rate which takes into account the size of a 
school by dividing the number of requests by the school’s total PK-12 enrollment.  Again, 
the majority of schools received a request rate close to zero (40.9 percent of requested 
schools had a request rate less than .01).  The largest request rate was .32 which was obtained 
by only one school. 
 Similar to the student requests, most student transfers clustered around one.  In this 
case, 19.3 percent of the 88 Albertville schools had only one or two transfers.  To account for 
the size of the school, again assuming larger schools to have a higher number of transfers, the 
transfer rate was also calculated, with 13.6 percent of the schools receiving a rate less than 
.01. 
 A final set of descriptive statistics to be outlined are the means and standard 
deviations for each of the four variables added to the datasets:  enrollment, FRL percent, 
minority percent, and MCA test scores.  It should be noted that these descriptives were 
determined using the request and transfer datasets (datasets containing 257 and 88 records) 
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not the smaller sets used for minority requests and minority transfers (datasets containing 222 
and 82 records). 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Predictor Variables 
 Sample Size Mean Value St. Deviation 
Variable Requested Previous Requested Previous Requested Previous 
Enrollment 257 88 707.39 444.80 509.35 356.44 
FRL 
Percent 257 88 46.15 73.24 30.41 21.24 
Minority 
Percent 257 88 47.99 76.63 30.23 20.20 
MCA 
Score 257 88 1508.96 1410.43 105.74 95.43 
 
Statistical Analysis 
With descriptive statistics being summarized, the results of the four specific tests of 
hypothesis can be outlined.  Each hypothesis is broken down into its own section containing 
a brief summary of the expected results along with the obtained results of the various models 
assumed for multiple regression.  More specifically, each hypothesis was tested by looking at 
five models using the transformed request or transfer number as the DV and five models 
using the transformed request or transfer rates.  Again, the transformations were completed 
due to violations made to the regression analysis (most critically, the violation to 
homogeneity of variance assumption) and the ten total models were required to account for 
issues of collinearity.  In addition, partial F-tests were calculated to determine the unique 
contribution of three of the predictor variables (FRL percent, minority percent, and MCA test 
scores).  
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Are student requests (and student request rates) a function of school enrollment, school FRL 
percent, school minority percent, and/or school MCA test scores?   
Assuming the intended consequences of NCLB to be true, specifically, assuming 
school choice leads to school improvement and better educational opportunities, one must 
further assume that when given the choice, students will leave substandard schools for better 
performing schools.  Using multiple regression to test this hypothesis, it was therefore 
expected that requests (and request rates) would be a function of enrollment, FRL percent, 
minority percent, and/or MCA test scores (Ho:  Ln(Requests) = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of 
the slopes is significant; Ho:  Arsin(Request Rate) = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the slopes is 
significant).  More specifically, when considering the operational definitions provided 
earlier, significant negative correlations would be expected for the relationship between FRL 
percent X requests and request rates, minority percent X requests and request rates, and 
enrollment X requests and request rates while a significant positive correlation would be 
expected for the relationship between MCA score X requests and request rates.  The 
following correlation matrix can be used to examine the relationship between these four 
variables and student requests or request rates: 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix:  Student Requests (y1) and Student Request Rate (y2).  N = 257 
 Y1 Y2 Ln (y1) 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
Enroll-
ment FRL % 
Minorit
y % 
MCA 
Score 
Y1 1.0 - - - - - - - 
Y2 .771** 1.0 - - - - - - 
Ln(y1) .789** .805** 1.0 - - - - - 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
.744** .960** .900** 1.0 - - - - 
Enrollment .247** -.134* .109 -.184** 1.0 - - - 
FRL % .033 .204** .137* .263** -.339** 1.0 - - 
Minority % .067 .220** .183** .285** -.297** .966** 1.0 - 
MCA Score -.081 -.199** -.139* -.243** .251** -.873** -.834** 1.0 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Only one of the highlighted correlations (correlations of most interest) is in the 
expected direction.  The significant negative correlation between Enrollment and 
Arsin(SqrtReqRate) is what the researcher expected and suggests larger schools to have 
lower request rates.   One can see how using a request rate instead of the raw request number 
can alter the results.  When using raw request number, the relationship between requests and 
size of school is positive (although not significant), but when using the request rate, that 
relationship becomes significantly negative.  Again, it is assumed that the rate is more 
accurate as it considers the size of the school when determining the number of transfers.  All 
other correlations are in the opposite direction of what would be expected and in all but one 
instance those correlations were significant.   
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It is also critical to look at the correlation between the four predictor variables in 
order to see the previously mentioned issues of collinearity.  Three considerably large 
coefficients were obtained when looking at the relationships between FRL percent, minority 
percent and MCA test score (rxy = .966, -.873, and -.834).  Because of these strong 
correlations all three variables were run in a model containing all three, along with three 
separate models containing only one variable at a time.  The results from the regression 
analysis are further depicted in the following table: 
Table 4 
Summary of Regression Results Predicting Requests and Request Rates 
 Ln(Requests) ARSIN(SqrtRequestRate) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Enrollment .109 t=1.76 
.176 
t=2.70 
.180 
t=2.82 
.154 
t=2.43 
.147 
t=2.25 
-.184 
t=-3.0 
-.107 
t=-1.7 
-.109 
t=-1.7 
-.131 
t=-2.1 
-.132 
t=-2.0 
FRL 
Percent - 
.196 
t=3.01 - - 
-.572 
t=-2.1 - 
.226 
t=3.54 - - 
-.398 
t=-1.5 
Minority 
Percent - - 
.237 
t=3.72 - 
.780 
t=3.00 - - 
.253 
t=4.04 - 
.546 
t=2.34 
MCA - - - -.178 t=-2.8 
-.083 
t=-0.7 - - - 
-.210 
t=-3.4 
-.102 
t=-.83 
Intercept 2.23 1.69 1.58 5.65 3.43 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.58 0.35 
F-value 3.09 6.13 8.54 5.53 5.45 8.93 10.92 12.91 10.32 7.01 
R2 .01 .05 .06 .04 .08 .03 .08 .09 .08 .10 
ΔR2 - .04 .05 .03 .07 - .05 .06 .05 .07 
Partial 
F-value - 9.08 13.83 7.88 18.50 - 12.47 16.07 11.33 18.20 
*For the partial F-test, the critical value = 3.84 (α = .05), 6.63 (α = .01), and 10.83 (α = .001) 
  
When request number and request rate were regressed on the four school success 
variables, those variables accounted for a small, but significant proportion of the variance in 
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all cases except for M1 looking only at PK-12 enrollment.  Looking at the models using 
transformed request numbers (M1-M5) the largest R2 value was obtained when taking all 
four variables in combination (R2 = .08, F(4, 252) = 5.45, p <.001).  Because of the high 
collinearity it is also important to look at M2 through M4 where only one of the three highly 
correlated variables are examined at a time.  In M3, considering enrollment and minority 
percent, six percent of the variance in requests can be explained.  Looking further to the 
partial F-value for M3, one can see minority percent, after controlling for enrollment, 
contributes significantly to the explanation of requests (Partial F=13.83 is significant at the 
.001 level).   
In all models, again with the exception of M1, the school success variables were 
significant predictors for student requests (all t-values were significant at the .05 level with 
some being significant at the .01 and .001 levels).  However, MCA score had little to no 
ability in predicting student requests when taking all four variables in combination (M5). 
 Using the same school variables to predict request rates resulted in slightly stronger 
results (i.e., slightly larger R2 values).  In all instances, M6 through M10, the variables 
explained a significant amount of the variance in request rates.  R2 ranged from .03 to .10, 
with F-values being significant at the .01 level for M6, and significant at the .001 level for all 
others.  Again, one can see that most variance can be explained when regressing request rate 
against all four school variables (R2 = .10, F(4, 252) = 7.01, p < .001).  However with issues 
of collinearity between FRL percent, minority percent and MCA score, it is once again 
critical to look at the models that consider only one of these three variables at a time.   In this 
case, minority percent again is able to explain the most variance in request rate.  Specifically, 
when regressing request rate with enrollment and minority percent, nine percent of the 
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variance in request rate can be explained.  The partial F-test shows that minority percent, 
after controlling for enrollment, contributes significantly to the explanation of request rates 
(Partial F = 16.07 is significant at the .001 level).  In these models (M6 through M9) all 
variables act as significant predictors when taken separately, but when taken in combination 
(M10), only enrollment and minority percent show predictive significance (again this is 
likely due to the three variables of FRL percent, minority percent, and MCA being highly 
correlated). 
Are student transfers and transfer rates a function of enrollment, FRL percent, minority 
percent, and/or MCA score?   
Similar to hypothesis #1, in assuming the intended consequences of NCLB to be true, 
one must further assume that when given the option, students/families will choose to leave 
substandard schools in order to receive a higher quality education elsewhere.  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis would be that schools lose students at equal rates, regardless of school 
success, while the alternative would be that more students (higher transfers and higher rates 
of transfer) are leaving unsuccessful schools than successful schools.  According to this 
hypothesis, using multiple regression, one would expect transfers and transfer rates to be a 
function of enrollment, FRL percent, minority percent and/or MCA scores (Ho:  
Ln(Transfers) = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the slopes is significant; Ho:  Arsin(Sqrt 
Transfer Rate) = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the slopes is significant).  More specifically, 
assuming the operational definitions provided earlier, positive correlations would be 
expected between FRL percent X transfers and transfer rates; minority percent X transfers 
and transfer rates; and enrollment X transfers and transfer rates.  Furthermore, one would 
expect to see a significant negative correlation for the relationship between MCA score X 
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transfers and transfer rates.  Again, the following correlation matrix can be used to examine 
the relationships between the four school level variables and transfers or transfer rates:  
Table 5 
Correlation Matrix:  Student Transfers (y1) and Student Transfer Rates (y2).  N = 88 
 Y1 Y2 Ln(y1) 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
Enroll-
ment FRL % 
Minorit
y % 
MCA 
Score 
Y1 1.0 - - - - - - - 
Y2 .614** 1.0 - - - - - - 
Ln(y1) .895* .633** 1.0 - - - - - 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
.635** .974** .702** 1.0 - - - - 
Enrollment .545 -.115 .540** -.098 1.0 - - - 
FRL % .123 .307** .137 .362** -.302** 1.0 - - 
Minority % .125 .243* .152 .309** -.216* .935** 1.0 - 
MCA Score .021 -.222* .042 -.269* .359** -.792** -.785** 1.0 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 In this analysis, more of the obtained results (specifically looking at the highlighted 
correlations) were consistent with what the researcher hypothesized.  Looking first at the 
transformed transfer numbers, one significant coefficient was obtained; that between 
transformed transfer number and enrollment (rxy = .540, p < .01).  This result indicates larger 
schools to be losing more students to open enrollment than smaller schools.  Once again, size 
of school could be impacting this result with larger schools losing more students simply 
because they have more students to lose.  Transfer rate may be more accurate for this reason.  
When looking at transformed transfer rate and enrollment, one can see that the correlation is 
no longer significant and actually is in the opposite direction suggesting a complete change in 
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the relationship.  All other coefficients for transformed transfer rate are significant and going 
in the expected direction.  That is a significant positive correlation was obtained for FRL 
percent X transformed transfer rate, a significant positive correlation for minority percent X 
transformed transfer rate and significant negative correlation was obtained for MCA score X 
transformed transfer rate.   
Again, because the relationships between FRL percent, minority percent, and MCA 
test score are so strong (rxy = .935, -.792, -.785), these variables were run in a model 
containing all three along with three separate models considering only one of these variables 
at a time.  The results from the regression analysis are further depicted in the following table:  
Table 6 
Summary of Regression Results Predicting Transfers and Transfer Rates 
 Ln(Transfers) ARSIN(SqrtTransferRate) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Enrollment .540 t=5.95 
.640 
t=7.20 
.601 
t=6.81 
.603 
t=6.28 
.618 
t=6.61 
-.098 
t=-0.9 
.012 
t=0.1 
-.033 
t=-0.3 
-.002 
t=-0.0 
.028 
t=.251 
FRL 
Percent - 
.330 
t=3.71 - - 
.536 
t=2.11 - 
.366 
t=3.45 - - 
.608 
t=1.99 
Minority 
Percent - - 
.282 
t=3.20 - 
-.062 
t=-0.2 - - 
.302 
t=2.86 - 
-.244 
t=-0.8 
MCA - - - -.175 t=-1.8 
.196 
t=1.34 - - - 
-.268 
t=-2.4 
.011 
t=0.06 
Intercept 1.69 0.35 0.47 4.33 -3.19 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.53 0.07 
F-value 35.44 27.24 24.72 19.85 14.18 0.84 6.43 4.55 3.31 3.35 
R2 .29 .39 .37 .32 .41 .01 .13 .10 .07 .14 
ΔR2 - .10 .08 .03 .12 - .12 .09 .06 .13 
Partial 
F-value - 13.78 10.21 3.32 15.95 - 11.43 8.14 5.86 12.14 
*For the partial F-test, the critical value = 3.96 (α = .05), 6.97 (α = .01), and 11.68(α = .001) 
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When predicting student transfers, the variables in all models accounted for a 
significant proportion of the variance, with the exception of M6.  In first looking at the 
models predicting transformed transfer numbers (M1 through M5), R2 values ranged from .29 
in M1 to .41 in M5 (in all cases the F-value was significant at the .001 level). Furthermore, 
several significant standardized coefficients were obtained (t-values range from 5.95 to 7.20).  
FRL percent seemed to be the strongest predictor of student transfers with R2 = .39, F(2,85) = 
27.24, p < .001 (for M2) and the partial F = 13.78, p < .001 indicating that after controlling 
for enrollment, FRL percent contributes significantly to the explanation of transfers.   
The models predicting transfer rates (M6 through M10) do not explain as much of the 
variance as when using transfer numbers.  Although that may be more accurate as these 
models take the size of the school into account by predicting transfer rates instead of raw 
transfer numbers.  One can see that when using transfer rate enrollment no longer 
demonstrates itself to be a significant variable in predicting student transfers.   However, the 
effects of FRL and minority percent remain significant (t = 3.45, p = .001 for FRL percent; t 
= 2.86, p < .01 for minority percent) when run in models separately and are consistent with 
the research hypothesis.  MCA score also shows significance in predicting student transfer 
rates (t = -2.4, p < .05). 
Are minority requests and minority request rates a function of school enrollment, school FRL 
percent, school minority percent, and/or school MCA scores?   
If NCLB is correct in assuming school choice will offer minority students the option 
of more quality educational choices, one must further claim that when given the option, 
minority students will choose higher performing schools to attend.  If minorities are not 
choosing higher performing schools, this goal will not be met.  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
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is schools receive minority requests at equal rates, regardless of school success while the 
alternative is that successful schools receive more minority requests (higher requests and 
higher request rates) than do unsuccessful schools.  Therefore, according to this hypothesis, 
when using multiple regression to analyze the data, one would expect minority requests and 
minority request rates to be a function of enrollment, FRL percent, minority percent, and/or 
MCA test scores (Ho:  Transformed Minority Requests = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the 
slopes is significant; Ho:  Transformed Minority Request Rate = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of 
the slopes is significant).  More specifically, when considering the operational definitions 
provided earlier, significant negative correlations would be expected for the relationship 
between FRL percent X minority requests and minority request rates; minority percent X 
minority requests and minority request rates; and enrollment X minority requests and 
minority request rates while a significant positive correlation would be expected for the 
relationship between MCA score X minority requests and minority request rates.  The 
following correlation matrix can be used to draw inferences about these relationships:  
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Table 7 
Correlation Matrix:  Minority Student Requests (y1) and Minority Student Request Rates (y2).  
N = 222 
 Y1 Y2 Ln(y1) 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
Enroll-
ment FRL % Min % 
MCA 
Score 
Y1 1.0 - - - - - - - 
Y2 .662** 1.0 - - - - - - 
Ln(y1) .783** .721** 1.0 - - - - - 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
.658** .968** .813** 1.0 - - - - 
Enrollment .301** .058 .163* .002 1.0 - - - 
FRL % .038 -.260** .091 -.233** -.360** 1.0 - - 
Minority 
% .067 -.259** .135* -.233** -.305** .967** 1.0 - 
MCA -.097 .182** -.120 .164* .283** -.876** -.840** 1.0 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Just looking at the correlations between the transformed variables and the four school 
variables, three are consistent with the research hypothesis, while the others go in the 
opposite direction of what was expected.  However, when looking at just the transformed 
request rate (which again may be more accurate since it takes the size of the school into 
consideration), all but one of the correlations is significant and in the expected direction.  The 
significant negative relationships between FRL percent X minority request rate and minority 
percent X minority request rate, as well as the significant positive relationship between MCA 
score X minority request rate are all in line with the expected results.  That is, higher FRL 
percent schools, and higher minority percent schools received a lower minority request rate 
than did lower FRL percent schools and lower minority percent school.  In addition, schools 
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with higher MCA scores received a higher minority student request rate than did those 
scoring lower on the MCA test.  The positive relationship between enrollment X minority 
request rate, although not significant, contradicts the expected results.   
Again, one can clearly see the high correlations between FRL percent, minority 
percent, and MCA score which requires these three variables to be run in separate models.  
The following table further depicts the results of multiple regression looking at minority 
requests and request rates as a possible function of enrollment, FRL percent, minority 
percent, and/or MCA score: 
Table 8 
Summary of Regression Results Predicting Minority Requests and Minority Request Rates  
 Ln(Minority Request) ARSIN(Sqrt Minority Request Rate) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Enrollment .163 t=2.45 
.225 
t=3.19 
.225 
t=3.28 
.214 
t=3.13 
.189 
t=2.66 
.002 
t=0.04 
-.093 
t=-1.3 
-.076 
t=-1.1 
-.048 
t=-0.7 
-.098 
t=-1.4 
FRL 
Percent - 
.172 
t=2.45 - - 
-.575 
t=-1.9 - 
-.266 
t=-2.8 - - 
-.398 
t=-1.3 
Minority 
Percent - - 
.204 
t=2.97 - 
.611 
t=2.34 - - 
-.256 
t=-3.7 - 
-.034 
t=-0.1 
MCA - - - -.181 t=-2.6 
-.164 
t=-1.2 - - - 
.177 
t=2.55 
-.186 
t=-1.4 
Intercept 2.14 1.67 1.57 5.35 4.93 0.26 0.35 0.35 -0.16 0.85 
F-value 6.01 6.06 7.51 6.56 4.74 .00 7.20 6.90 3.25 4.07 
R2 .03 .05 .06 .06 .08 .00 .06 .06 .03 .07 
ΔR2 - .02 .03 .03 .05 - .06 .06 .03 .07 
Partial 
F-value - 5.98 8.80 6.96 12.68 - 14.48 13.93 6.54 16.41 
*For the partial F-test, the critical value = 3.84 (α = .05), 6.63 (α = .01), and 10.83 (α = .001) 
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Looking at Table 8, one can see that in all cases (with the exception of M6), the 
predictor variables account for a small, but significant proportion of the variance in minority 
requests and minority request rates (R2 ranges from .03 to .08).  Looking first at M1 through 
M5 which predict minority requests, significant standardized coefficients were obtained for 
all predictor variables.  Furthermore, looking at the partial F-values which demonstrate the 
unique contribution of FRL percent, minority percent, or MCA score, after controlling for 
enrollment, all three variables contribute significantly to the explanation of minority requests 
(partial F = 5.98, p < .05; partial F = 8.80, p < .01; partial F = 6.96, p < .01, respectively).  
However, when regressing all four variables at the same time (M5), only enrollment and 
minority percent show significance (t = 2.66, p < .01 for enrollment; t = 2.34, p < .05 for 
minority percent).   
Models 6 through 8 show similar results, with around three to seven percent of the 
variance in minority request rates being explained by the predictor variables, depending on 
the proposed model.  One large change to note is the impact of enrollment.  When shifting to 
the use of minority request rates as the DV, the predictive impact of enrollment both changes 
direction and loses significance.  For example, when comparing M4 to its equivalent, M9, the 
coefficient for enrollment changes from .214 (t=3.13) to -.048 (t=-0.7).  Similar results can 
be seen across all models.  When only considering enrollment and one other school variable, 
standardized coefficients for those variables are significant and in the hypothesized direction.  
However, when regressing all four variables on minority request rate (M10), none of the 
variables show significance.  This again shows the impact of collinearity among variables.   
55 
Are minority transfers and minority transfer rates a function of enrollment, FRL percent, 
minority percent, and/or MCA scores? 
If NCLB is correct in assuming school choice will offer student minorities the option 
of more quality educational choices, one must further claim that when given the option, 
minority students will choose to leave their (potentially) unsuccessful school.  If minorities 
are not leaving unsuccessful schools, this goal will not be met.  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
is schools lose minority students at equal rates, regardless of school success while the 
alternative is that unsuccessful schools lose more minority students (have higher transfers 
and higher transfer rates) than do successful schools.  Therefore, according to this hypothesis, 
one would expect minority transfers and minority transfer rates to be a function of 
enrollment, FRL percent, minority percent and/or MCA scores (Ho:  Transformed Minority 
Transfers = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the slopes is significant; Ho:  Transformed Minority 
Transfer Rate = βo + Єi, HA:  At least one of the slopes is significant).  More specifically, 
assuming the operational definitions provided earlier, positive correlations were expected 
between FRL percent X transformed minority transfers and minority transfer rates; minority 
percent X transformed minority transfers and minority transfer rates; and enrollment X 
transformed minority transfers and minority transfer rates.  Furthermore, one would expect to 
see a significant negative correlation for the relationship between MCA score X transformed 
minority transfers and minority transfer rates.  Again, the following correlation matrix can be 
used to examine the relationships between the four school level variables and minority 
transfers and/or minority transfer rates:  
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Table 9 
Correlation Matrix:  Minority Student Transfers (Y1) and Minority Student Transfer Rates 
(Y2). N = 82 
 Y1 Y2 Ln(y1) 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
Enroll-
ment FRL % Min % 
MCA 
Score 
Y1 1.0 - - - - - - - 
Y2 .520** 1.0 - - - - - - 
Ln(y1) .895** .582** 1.0 - - - - - 
Arsin 
(Sqrty2) 
.555** .975** .652** 1.0 - - - - 
Enrollment .562** -.105 .562** -.075 1.0 - - - 
FRL % .146 .196 .121 .179 -.330** 1.0 - - 
Minority 
% .196 .166 .175 .150 -.234* .922** 1.0 - 
MCA 
Score .021 -.182 .094 -.158 .419** -.750** -.741** 1.0 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Again, looking only at the highlighted correlations one can see that only one of these 
correlations is significant.  The relationship between enrollment and transformed minority 
transfers is positive suggesting larger schools to have more minority transfers.  However, this 
strong relationship is likely due to the nature of the variable being used.  High enrollment 
schools likely have higher minority transfers simply because they have more minority student 
populations to begin with.  Therefore, like all other instances, the minority transfer rate is 
more appropriate to use.  When using this variable, none of the correlations, including that 
between enrollment and transfer rate are significant (although all are going in the 
hypothesized direction).   
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 A final note to make about the correlation matrix is again the high correlations 
between FRL percent, minority percent, and MCA score (rxy = .922, -.750, -.741).  Because 
of this all three variables were run in separate models along with one model containing all 
three in order to demonstrate and account for issues of collinearity.  Taking the analysis a 
step further, the following table describes the results using multiple regression to determine 
to what extent enrollment minority student transfers and transfer rates are a function of FRL 
percent, minority percent, and/or MCA test scores: 
Table 10 
Summary of Regression Results Predicting Minority Transfers and Minority Transfer Rates 
 Ln(Minority Transfer) ARSIN(Sqrt Minority Transfer Rate) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Enrollment .562 t=6.08 
.675 
t=7.45 
.638 
t=7.2 
.634 
t=6.30 
.621 
t=6.37 
-.075 
t=-0.7 
-.018 
t=-0.2 
-.042 
t=-0.4 
-.011 
t=-1.3 
.006 
t=0.05 
FRL 
Percent - 
.344 
t=3.79 - - 
.291 
t=1.24 - 
.174 
t=1.48 - - 
.249 
t=0.81 
Minority 
Percent - - 
.324 
t=3.67 - 
.200 
t=.855 - - 
.140 
t=1.23 - 
-.130 
t=-0.4 
MCA - - - -.172 t=-1.7 
.200 
t=1.44 - - - 
-.153 
t=-1.3 
-.071 
t=-0.4 
Intercept 1.60 0.11 0.13 4.23 -3.63 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.39 0.25 
F-value 36.94 28.73 28.06 20.37 15.00 0.46 1.33 0.98 1.02 0.72 
R2 .32 .42 .42 .34 .44 .01 .03 .02 .03 .04 
ΔR2 - .10 .10 .02 .12 - .02 .01 .02 .03 
Partial 
F-value - 14.36 13.43 2.92 16.72 - 2.17 1.5 1.5 2.33 
 
Similar to minority requests and minority request rates, one can see the difference in 
obtained R2 values between using raw transfer numbers and transfer rates; with the raw 
numbers again resulting in models with much higher R2 values.  R2 in M1 through M5 are 
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relatively large ranging from .32 to .44.  With such a large percent of the variance in transfers 
being explained in these models, the corresponding F-values are also quite large (F ranges 
from 15.00 to 36.94, all of which are significant at the .001 level).  However, when trying to 
predict minority transfer rate (the more appropriate DV) the variance explained by those 
models dramatically decreases, with .05 being the largest R2 value obtained.  In fact, none of 
the variables in any of these models have standardized coefficients that show predictive 
significance.   
Accordingly, similar dramatic differences can be seen by examining the sole impact 
of enrollment.  Enrollment is a strong predictor with larger schools having more transfers in 
M1 through M5.  However, the size of the school alone is likely skewing this result so it is 
more appropriate to look at the transfer rate which takes the size of the school into account.  
When looking at the models that assume the transfer rate for the DV, one can clearly see the 
large discrepancy in the results.  Examining the standardized coefficients, the relationship 
between enrollment and transfer rates is negative and no longer significant (it begins to show 
a positive relationship in M10, but again this coefficient is too small to show predictive 
significance). 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS 
Limitations of Data 
Before reviewing the results and possible implications of this research, there are 
several limitations to the data that must be discussed.  First, the four school level predictor 
variables (not including MCA score) were not ideal for this investigation.  Using actual AYP 
measures (test scores, proficiency rate, graduation rate, and attendance rate), since these are 
the exact variables used by NCLB to measure school success, would have been a far better 
way of indirectly measuring the role of NCLB in a school district already operating under 
existing choice options.  However, these variables could not be obtained for all schools so 
enrollment, FRL percent, and minority percent needed to be used in their stead.  While these 
variables have been shown to be predictors of student and/or school achievement, they are 
not directly tied to the school choice provision under investigation. 
It is interesting to note however, that of the four predictor variables, MCA score (the 
one variable directly related to the idea of NCLB school success) was the variable 
determined to be the least important in predicting student requests and transfers.  A 
significant standardized coefficient was obtained for only five of the 16 possible models in 
which MCA was included.  This suggests that when choosing a school to attend or a school 
to transfer out of, the schools’ overall test performance does not seem to be a critical factor in 
that decision for parents/students. 
This fact brings up the importance of considering other variables to define school 
success and predict student transfers and requests.  It would seem worthwhile to expand the 
current definition of school success to include variables shown to be important to parents 
and/or students such as closeness to home, special programs offered, extra-curricular 
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activities offered, etc.  Expanding the variables may offer important insight into what factors 
go into making a decision to transfer and/or enroll one’s student in a particular school. 
In addition to the limitations of the predictor variables used in this investigation, there 
were no variables in the datasets that captured a student’s SES or achievement level (these 
variables were only available at the school level).  This would be helpful in considering the 
second assumption of school choice – offering more opportunity for low-income, low-
achieving students.  Using these two indicators would have therefore, been more helpful for 
Hypotheses #3 and #4.  However, because minority status is shown to be closely related to 
SES and academic achievement, and was further a variable available to the researcher, it was 
assumed for this study.  Again, using the direct measure of a student’s SES and academic 
achievement would have made for stronger arguments and results.   
It should finally be noted that attempts were made to obtain data on NCLB school 
choice users, inquirers and eligibles for the Albertville school district, but all efforts failed 
(even though district approval was granted to complete this study).  This failure to obtain 
data resulted in modifications to research questions and methods.  The use of this data would 
be helpful in examining NCLB more directly than what was accomplished with the modified 
study. 
Discussion 
Are Students Choosing More Successful Schools to Attend 
 While all but one of the models tested under hypothesis #1 obtained significant 
results, few of the coefficients pointed in the hypothesized direction.  In M1 through M5 
(models using transformed request number) all coefficients were positive, with the exception 
of FRL percent (only in M5) and MCA score (which was only significant in M4).  
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Furthermore, looking at M6 through M10 (models using transformed request rate) only 
enrollment came through as being both a significant predictor of request rate and in the 
hypothesized direction (in M6 and M10 only). 
 Taking these results and going back to the literature and the assumptions of school 
choice, the results under this hypothesis show support for those who oppose school choice.  
By considering low enrollment, low FRL percent and low minority percent schools to be 
more successful, this study indicates students are not choosing more successful schools to 
attend.  If students are not choosing better schools to attend the notion of competition leading 
to school improvement is further refuted.  With students not requesting better schools, 
substandard schools are not likely to feel pressures to improve, and therefore this goal of 
NCLB would not be met.  Since the open enrollment program does not seem to produce 
pressures on schools through competition, one must question the ability of NCLB school 
choice to produce such pressure. 
Are Students Transferring out of Non-successful Schools 
 The models tested under hypothesis #2 accounted for far more of the variance in 
transfers than was obtained under hypothesis #1 predicting student requests.  Furthermore, 
the results from these tests were consistent with the research hypothesis.  In M1 through M3 
the coefficients for enrollment, FRL percent and minority percent were positive and 
significant in all cases.  The coefficient for MCA score in M4 was negative, but not yet 
reaching significance (p=0.072).  When regressing all school level variables against students 
transfers (M5), only enrollment and FRL percent show predictive significance.  R2 values are 
greatly reduced in M6 through M10, using transformed transfer rate, but these results are 
likely more accurate.  Enrollment no longer shows to be a predictor of student transfers, but 
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the other three variables show similar results as in M1 through M5.  In this instance, MCA 
score reaches significance.   All results from M1 through M10 (with the exception enrollment  
not predicting transfer rate) are in-line with the research hypothesis and suggest that students 
are transferring from less successful schools more often than from successful schools 
(assuming the operational definitions provided).  
 Unlike hypothesis #1, the results under this hypothesis coincide with those who 
support school choice.  Again, by considering low enrollment, low FRL percent, and low 
minority percent schools to be more successful and further considering high MCA schools to 
be more successful, this aspect of the study would support the pro-choice side of the debate 
as it reports students to be leaving unsuccessful schools more than successful schools.  While 
this is an important piece of information, and also a criteria for competition to be produced 
(i.e., if students are not leaving substandard schools, the possible effects of competition 
become irrelevant), these results are still only preliminary, with further research being 
required to make more conclusive statements about school choice.  For example, while it can 
be seen that students are leaving unsuccessful schools more than successful schools, the type 
of school to which they are transferring to cannot be concluded from the findings here.  This 
would add important insight into the discussion.  Perhaps they are not moving from 
unsuccessful schools to more successful schools.  It could be possible that students leave one 
unsuccessful school to another school performing at the same or lesser level.  Furthermore, 
while this study describes unsuccessful schools to be losing more students to open 
enrollment, it cannot be concluded if transferring from poor schools creates incentives for 
those schools to improve.  Again, this would require additional research and inquiry. 
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 Finally, if students are leaving unsuccessful schools through open enrollment, the 
addition of NCLB school choice can be questioned.  Would more student transfers seem 
likely, or is the addition of this provision redundant and unnecessary for a district such as 
Albertville?  Pairing the results from this hypothesis with the number of students using open 
enrollment in Albertville (especially when compared to those who participate in NCLB 
school choice), one may conclude that indeed, where pre-existing open-enrollment programs 
are present, the provisions of NCLB are redundant. 
Are Minority Students Choosing Successful Schools to Attend 
   Since the models tested under this hypothesis are a subset of those tested under 
hypothesis #1, similar results were obtained.  For variables in M1 through M4, significant 
standardized coefficients were obtained, but again, they were not in line with the research 
hypothesis.  This suggests minority students to not be requesting successful schools more 
than unsuccessful ones.  In M6 through M10, the R2 values remained about the same, 
explaining between three to seven percent of the variance in minority request rates, but the 
standardized coefficients switched direction and remained significant.  These results would 
suggest that minority students are requesting successful schools more often than unsuccessful 
ones, a major difference from looking at the first five models under this hypothesis.   
 In this case, instead of looking at the assumption of competition, the results will be 
couched in the equal educational opportunity assumption.  Looking only at M6 through M10 
(since they are argued by the researcher to be using a more accurate DV of transformed 
transfer rate), the results from this hypothesis would support the position held by those who 
agree with school choice and its positive impacts.  Specifically, they would support those 
who argue school choice leads to more equal educational opportunities for minority students.  
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Minority students, if given the opportunity to attend a school of their choosing, seem to be 
choosing successful schools over unsuccessful schools.  Using open enrollment to determine 
the role of NCLB school choice, it can therefore be shown that school choice may be 
effective in providing low-income, low-achieving students with sufficiently better 
educational options.  Once again, while this seems to support NCLB, it may also cause 
reason to question how NCLB would produce significantly different results.  That is to say, if 
open enrollment seems to be fulfilling this goal of NCLB, is the addition of the provision 
necessary?   
Similar to other hypotheses, these statements are not conclusive as the researcher is 
unaware of students’ previous school in relation to the school they chose to attend through 
open enrollment.  While this aspect of the study shows minority students to be requesting 
successful schools more than unsuccessful schools, it is possible that in several of these cases 
the requested school may not performing at a significantly higher level than a student’s 
previous school.  This would require additional research.   
Are Minority Students Transferring out of Non-successful Schools 
Looking first at M1 through M5, enrollment seems to be a strong predictor of 
minority transfers. However, when taking the transfer variable and standardizing it according 
to school size (by using transformed transfer rate), it can be easily observed that enrollment 
has little to no ability in predicting minority transfers.  While all other coefficients in M1 
through M10 are in the hypothesized direction, few show predictive significance.  Only FRL 
percent and minority percent in M2 and M3 (models using the misleading transfer variable) 
obtained significant t-values.   
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 Since none of the variables in M6 through M10 seem to predict minority transfer rate, 
and since the models as a whole explain very little of the variance in minority transfer rate, it 
could be concluded that a school’s success level (assuming the variables and operational 
definitions of this study) has little impact on a parent’s decision to transfer their student from 
a particular school.  Therefore, couching the results in the literature and in the educational 
opportunity assumption, the pro-choice side of the debate would not be supported by these 
findings.  Specifically, this study shows minority transfers are not a function of the four 
school success indicators.  Therefore, when given the choice, minority students do not appear 
to be transferring from a school based on variables considered for this study.  Again, it would 
be more insightful to examine what school they are choosing to attend in relation to their 
previous school.  In this way one could add information to the argument by possibly being 
able to confirm that students are leaving unsuccessful schools for more successful schools.   
Overall Conclusions 
 While several statistically significant results were obtained in this investigation, few 
strong conclusions can be made with regards to the role of NCLB school choice.  There are 
several inconsistencies within the study itself as well as between this study and past research.  
For example, several of the tested models resulted in support for school choice and its benefit 
for student populations and schools in Albertville, while several others contested the 
assumptions of schools choice.   
 However, in both cases, when support is given and when opposition to choice is 
demonstrated, an important question can be addressed:  what is the role of NCLB in a district 
that already provides choice options to its students?  When the results are in line with the 
goals of NCLB (i.e., when results show students to be leaving unsuccessful schools and/or 
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requesting successful one) one may conclude the addition of NCLB school choice to be 
unnecessary.  In addition, when the results show opposition to the assumptions and goals of 
NCLB school choice (i.e., when results show students do not request successful schools 
and/or transfer from unsuccessful ones), one may question the ability of NCLB to provide 
significantly different results.  In either case, it seems that for a district such as Albertville, 
that already operates under extensive choice programs, the addition of the NCLB school 
choice provision would not provide additional benefits for the schools and/or for the students 
they serves. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study was an introductory look into the impact of NCLB school choice. Future 
research may want to consider expanding this preliminary examination by studying the actual 
reasons for choosing particular schools.  This could be achieved through interviews to 
determine exactly why parents chose to send their child to a particular school – what 
variables are involved in this decision (clearly, the variables examined in this study account 
for only a small part of the variance).  Also, in examining NCLB more directly, it may be 
helpful, particularly in Minnesota, to investigate why those who inquired about NCLB school 
choice, ultimately chose not to take advantage of the provision.  Another interesting direction 
would be interviewing those who are eligible, but make no attempts to find out more about 
the choice option.  Reasons describing this lack of participation and inquiry could help in 
modifying the provision to be more helpful and effective for more families. 
Finally, this study only considers a previous school OR a requested school, it did not 
look at the two in conjunction.  It would therefore be helpful to consider the school from 
which students leave in relation to the school they choose to attend.  For example, while this 
67 
study could make statements about the type of schools students are choosing to attend (e.g., 
larger schools receive more requests than smaller schools), it does not show the difference 
between the requested school and the school from which they transferred.  Perhaps the school 
they choose is performing better than their previous school, but when compared to other 
requested schools, it ranks as an unsuccessful school. 
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APPENDIX A 
Minnesota Open Enrollment Form 
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APPENDIX B 
Transfer Reason Codes 
1 – Convenience 
 1.0 = Close to day care 
 1.2 = Close to employer 
 1.3 = Close to home 
2 – Academic 
 2.0 = Better program outside resident district 
 2.1 = Program not in resident district 
3 – Objections to Resident District 
 3.0 = Could not get school of choice in resident district 
 3.4 = Object to conditions in resident district  
4 – Class Size 
 4.1 = Smaller student body or class size 
5 – Social 
 5.0 = Friends/relatives go to non-resident school/dist 
 5.1 = Siblings go to non-resident school/district 
 5.3 = Greater cultural diversity among students/staff 
6 – Move 
 6.0 = Moved, to continue at the same school 
 6.1 = Anticipate moving into non-resident district 
7 – Employee 
 7.0 = To attend the school/district I teach in 
8 – Expelled 
 8.0 = Expelled from resident district 
9 – Other 
 9.0 = Miscellaneous 
 9.2 = Previously attended 
 9.5 = Lives with other than parent/guardian 
 9.9 = Enrolled without paperwork 
10 – No reason given 
11 – Continued Enrollment of 11th and 12th Graders 
12 – High School graduation incentives  
 
